AN EVALUATION OF INLATION FORECASTS FROM SURVEYS USING REAL-TIME DATA
An earlier paper, Croushore (2005) examined forecasts of consumer price inflation to test whether such forecasts from surveys (Michigan, Livingston, and Survey of Professional Forecasters) were biased and inefficient, as researchers found in the early 1980s. That paper ran the same types of tests that were performed 20 years ago on an updated sample, and found that the forecasts were neither biased nor inefficient.
Arguably, consumer price inflation is not the best measure of inflation because of index construction problems. Better measures of trend inflation come from other variables, such as the GDP deflator. But forecasts of the inflation rate in the GDP deflator are more difficult to evaluate because the past data are revised.
As part of the research program into rational expectations in the early 1980s, economists tested the inflation forecasts based on the GDP deflator from surveys and found a disturbing result: the forecasts exhibited bias and inefficiency. If macroeconomic forecasters had rational expectations, the forecast errors should have had much better properties; instead, the forecasters appeared to make systematic errors.
Researchers concluded that perhaps macroeconomic forecasters were irrational or perhaps the surveys were poor measures of inflation expectations. The major consequence was that forecast surveys developed a poor reputation and many researchers ignored them as a source of data on people's expectations.
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But perhaps the researchers in the early 1980s were hasty in their denunciation of the surveys. If the researchers were correct, then it should have been a simple task to use their empirical results and provide new and improved forecasts that were better than those sold in the market. The question is, were their results special to the data sample of the time? Also, were their results possibly an artifact of the data they were using? After all, the GDP deflator is revised substantially. And the sample period in which most of the earlier tests were performed was a time with numerous shocks to relative prices, which were only slowly reflected in the GDP weights. As a result, a real-time analysis of the data is paramount.
THE DATA
In examining data on inflation and forecasts of inflation, we must account for the noise in high frequency measures of the data. Analysts typically do not care about monthly or quarterly movements of inflation, but often analyze it over longer periods, such as one year. Because forecasts are often taken at such a frequency, the focus of this paper is on inflation and inflation forecasts measured over (roughly) a one-year time span.
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The real-time data set that we use to evaluate the forecasts is based on the work of Croushore and Stark. 3 The Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists collects snapshots 1 See Maddala (1991) and Thomas (1999) for literature reviews.
2 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) provide a cogent description of the noise in inflation data.
3 Croushore and Stark (2001) describe the structure of the Real-Time Data Set for
Macroeconomists and evaluate data revisions to some variables. Stark and Croushore (2002) show how data revisions affect forecasts, while Croushore and Stark (2003) illustrate how data revisions have influenced major macroeconomic research studies.
of numerous macroeconomic time series data once each quarter since November 1965.
Data within any vintage of the data set can be used to show precisely what data were available to a forecaster at any given date. The GDP deflator is one of the variables included within the data set. The timing of the vintages is as of the middle day of the middle month of each quarter.
The only two surveys that span the period from the 1970s to today with forecasts for the GDP deflator are the Livingston Survey and the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. The Livingston Survey, which began in the 1940s, collects its forecasts from a wide array of economists, not all of whom have forecasting as their main job. 4 The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which was known as the ASA-NBER Survey from 1968 to 1990 before it was taken over by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, collect its forecasts from economists for whom forecasting is a major part of their jobs.
The Livingston survey collects economists' forecasts of real output and nominal output (GNP until 1991 , GDP since 1992 (1) inflation rose much higher than the forecasters thought it would after the oil price shocks of the 1970s (more so in the Livingston survey than in the SPF); (2) the forecasters were slow to reduce expected inflation in the early 1980s and their forecast errors were negative for a time (more so in the SPF than in the Livingston survey); (3) forecast errors were fairly close to zero from the mid-1980s to about 2000 (though the SPF forecasts were persistently too high by a small amount in the 1990s); and (4) the upswing in inflation in the past few years caught forecasters by surprise.
Given these features of the data, we would like to know if the forecasts are unbiased, and whether it would have been possible for an observer to make better forecasts just by observing past forecast errors.
REAL-TIME DATA ISSUES
Before we examine the quality of the forecasts, we must tackle the difficult issue of what to use as actuals for calculating forecast errors. In the discussion above, we based our analysis solely on the latest-available data (as of August 2005), which is what is typically done in the forecasting literature. But forecasters are quite unlikely to have anticipated the extent of data revisions to the price index that would not occur for many years in the future. More likely, they made their forecasts anticipating the same methods of data construction being used contemporaneously by the government statistical agencies.
How big are the revisions to the data on the price index for output? In the realtime data set we can consider a variety of actuals, including the value recorded one-year after the initial release, the value recorded three years after the initial release, the last value recorded before a new benchmark revision occurs (a concept that maintains a consistent method by which the government calculates growth rates, including the same base year), and the value recorded in the latest available data (as of August 2005). How different are these alternative concepts of actuals? And how large are the consequent data revisions? Figure 3 shows all four concepts for actuals that we use in this paper for the fourquarter inflation rate. For each date shown on the horizontal axis, the actual value is defined as the inflation rate from four quarters ago to that date. In the figure, it is hard to see big differences across the vintages, but the differences are as large as 1.4 percent, which could lead to somewhat different forecast errors. Also, there are periods with persistent differences between the actuals, as in 1971 to 1973, 1979 to 1980, 1989 to 1991, and 1994 to 1998. Revisions from initial release to each of the actuals also varies substantially, as the four panels of Figure 4 show. The four panels all have the same scale, so you can observe the relative size of the revisions to the data, and plots both quarterly data (so you can observe when shocks to the one-quarter inflation rate occur) and four-quarter data Because the scaling in Figures 3 and 4 have a wide range to accommodate all the data, it is hard to discern how a particular number was revised. But for any observation date, it is possible to track the inflation rate as it is successively revised across all the vintages since its initial release. This is done in Figure 6 for the inflation rate between This table shows the inflation rates over the five year periods shown in the first column for each pre-benchmark vintage shown in the column header.
ARE THE FORECASTS BIASED?
In the literature on testing forecasts for accuracy, a key test is one to see if the forecasts are biased. A forecast is biased if forecasts differ systematically from their realized values. We examine bias in forecasts by regressing the actuals on the forecasts and testing the null hypothesis that the constant term equals zero and the slope coefficient equals one. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the forecasts are biased. We will examine regressions of this type, using our four alternative definitions of actuals to see if the test results are sensitive to the choice of actuals.
A glance at the early years shown in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the forecasts are biased. Because many of the studies of biasedness in the survey data were undertaken in the early 1980s, during the period in which the theory of rational expectations was being tested empirically, it is clear why the tests suggested that they survey forecasts were not rational.
Scatter plots of the data from both surveys allow us to eyeball the bias in the surveys, as shown in Figure 7 . In the period from 1971 to 1981, there is a clear tendency in both surveys for the forecasts to be too low (points to the left of the 45-degree line) relative to actuals. After that, however, from 1982 to 2004 the forecasts are much better in both surveys, with a slight tendency in the SPF for the forecasts of inflation to be too high. To examine the bias more formally, we run the bias test, based on the regression:
where p t is the actual inflation rate and f t π is the forecast at each date t. If the forecasts are not biased, we should estimate α = 0 and β = 1, as first suggested by Theil (1966) . Webb (1987) , however, has challenged this view of bias, arguing that even if we reject this joint hypothesis, data revisions, coefficients that cha nge over time, and peso-type problems may prevent someone from using the results of Equation (1) to make better forecasts.
Most studies have focused on bias tests for inflation by looking at the consumer price index, as in Croushore (2005) . Only a few studies have examined the output price index as we do here. Perhaps the most notable is Zarnowitz (1985) , who finds bias in the forecasts. Though Zarnowitz's results are overturned by Keane-Runkle (1990) , who find evidence against bias using individual data, rather than the survey average data that Zarnowitz used. Zarnowitz, however, looked at only one latest-available vintage as actuals, so we will test whether such results are due to the choice of actuals.
In testing forecasts over a four-quarter (SPF) or five-quarter horizon (Livingston), we face the issue of overlapping observations. Because the forecasts span a longer period than the sampling frequency, any shock affects the actuals for several consecutive periods. For example, an oil price shock in 1973:Q2 affects any measurement of actuals that includes that quarter and therefore the forecast errors for forecasts made over the period including 1973:Q2. For the SPF, this means that the forecast errors from surveys taken in 1972: Q2, 1972:Q3, 1972:Q4, 1973:Q1, and 1973 :Q2 are all correlated; for the Livingston survey, correlation occurs among forecast errors from surveys taken in 1972: H1, 1972:H2, and 1973:H1. To allow for these overlapping observations, we must either cut the SPF sample into five pieces (taking every fifth observation) and the Livingston survey into three pieces, or adjust the covariance matrix using methods suggested by Brown and Maital (1981) , using the method of Hansen and Hodrick (1980) , perhaps as modified by Newey and West (1987) to guarantee a positive definite covariance matrix. Table 2 shows the results of the test for bias for the Livingston survey and the SPF, with both alternative methods of accounting for overlapping observations and with two different actuals, latest available and pre-benchmark. The test is run for both the first 11 years of the sample (1971 to 1981) and for the full sample. The coefficient estimates for Equation (1) are shown along with the 2 R , the Durbin-Watson statistic, and the p-value for the joint hypothesis test of a zero constant and slope = 1. When we use the sample with overlapping observations, the p-value is based on a chi-squared test using the Newey-West method for adjusting the covariance matrix. When we split the sample to avoid the problem of overlapping observations, the p-value is based on an F test.
For the Livingston survey, shown in panel a, using latest-available data on actuals, we reject the null hypothesis of unbiased forecasts for the 1971 to 1981 period; but over the full sample, we do not reject the null. We get the same result no matter how we deal with the overlapping-observations problem with actuals being the latest available data. This result is weakened somewhat when we use pre-benchmark vintages as actuals, in which case the adjustment of the covariance matrix to deal with the overlapping-observations problem on the early sample leads to no rejection of the null hypothesis. But for two of the three split samples, we continue to reject the null hypothesis for the 1971 to 1981 period. For the SPF, however, the survey looks more unbiased. The only rejection that we have is for the overlapping-observations sample for the 1971 to 1981 period; in all other cases, we do not reject the null. Looking at other actuals (one-year later and three-years later), the pattern in terms of rejections of the null hypothesis is exactly like that for pre-benchmark actuals for both surveys, so those results are not reported here. 
FORECAST-IMPROVEMENT EXERCISES
The next question we seek to answer is: if you observed the pattern of past forecast errors, could you have used the knowledge to make better forecasts? Consider trying to improve on the forecasts in the following way. Run the bias regression in Equation (1), estimate α and β , then create a new and improved forecast,
Those who argued in the early 1980s that the forecasts were irrational suggested that this approach would have led forecasters to have much smaller forecast errors than in fact they had. But suppose we had followed their advice over time. How big would the subsequent forecast errors be? And would following this advice lead to a lower rootmean-squared forecast error (RMSFE)?
Running this experiment, using real-time data, leads to the results shown in Table   3 . The results show that the use of Equation (2) to improve the survey results is not very fruitful. Interestingly enough, the root-mean-squared-forecast error for the original survey is not much affected by whether we use as actuals the one-quarter-later value or the one-year-later value. However, the choice of actuals strongly affects the forecast improvement results, because different actuals lead to very different values on the lefthand-side of Equation (2). The results suggest that it is better to use as an actual value a number reported shortly after the survey was made.
{To be added: regressions using rolling windows of data rather than full sample and Diebold-Mariano tests of significance of the different RMSEs, plus investigation over subsamples.} The results are shown in Table 4 . Choosing a significance level of .05, we reject the null for a sample split into n sub-samples at a significance level of .05/n. More precisely, if we have n independent samples, for each sample the relevant significance level is a, where a is given by the equation: 1 -(1 -a) n = 0.05. For n = 3, a = 0.0170;
for n = 5, a = 0.0102. If the p-value shown in the right-hand column is less than this, we would reject the null hypothesis.
In no case do we reject the null hypothesis that the forecast errors are independent with a zero median. Thus the forecasts appear to pass the sign test, at least for using latest-available data as actuals and pre-benchmark data as actuals. where the forecast errors are ranked in increasing order, which is distributed as a standard normal. Table 5 shows the results, with p-values reported in the last column. The null hypothesis is never rejected for any of the subsamples for both surveys. The results are shown in Table 7 . Again, in no case do we reject the null hypothesis. Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that the forecast errors are white noise. Pearce (1979) . Pearce made the observation that, looking at CPI data, if you were to simply estimate an ARIMA model using standard Box-Jenkins techniques, you would create better forecasts than the Livingston survey had. This test was so simple that it convinced even the most diehard supporter of rational expectations that something was wrong with the survey forecasts. But, again, Pearce's sample period happened to be fairly short and was a period in which inflation generally rose unexpectedly. With more than 20 more years, is Pearce's result still valid? Croushore (2005) argues that it is not for the case of the CPI. We can run a similar exercise for the output price index.
Pearce assumed that the model appropriate for inflation was an IMA(1,1) process.
We run one set of experiments based on that process, and another in which we assume an AR process that is determined by calculating SIC values period by period, thus allowing the model to change over time. We also run two permutations, one with real-time data and one with latest-available data, to see how much real-time data matters for creating such forecasts, as in Stark and Croushore (2002) .
The results of the exercise are shown in Table 8 . There is little support for the view that a simple ARIMA model can do better than the survey forecasts. The best evidence in favor of the ARIMA model comes from using latest-available data rather than real-time data, and only when latest-available data are used as actuals. Thus there is no way that a forecaster in real time could have used an ARIMA model to improve on the survey forecasts. much longer sample of data, which goes beyond the years in which movements of inflation were dominated by oil-price shocks, we find that the inflation forecasts pass those statistical tests convincingly. In addition, the evaluation of forecast errors depends in part on the choice of actuals, with actuals taken to be latest-available data providing the least favorable evaluation of the forecasts.
